SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC ERA

By

Professor Aja Akpuru-Aja

Introduction

          May 29, 1999 was heralded by many Nigerians as the arrival of a renewed democratic era, when the elected Obasanjo civilian administration was inaugurated to end authoritarian regimes. Many perceived the return of democracy as the much expected opportunity to correct some mistakes of the past and negative trends in political economy and security sector governance. It was seen as an opportunity to transform the country’s rich resource potentials into value adding chains, which is an imperative to address internal threats associated with poor conceptualization of security sector governance. Another level of euphoria of expectation came from the assumption that civilian leaders are good governors of the security sector than authoritarian regimes. This is not absolutely true. Asian tigers’ experiences, like Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia which fluctuated between authoritarian and civilian regimes achieved phenomenal economic growth and development. Indeed, civilian leaders are not necessarily and automatically good governors (Jega: 171). The hallmark of good security sector governance is driven by knowledge content, character and passion for public spirited service.

          Today, May 29, 2012 marks 13 years of uninterrupted democratization process (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011). Despite several lines of security challenges, the military has demonstrated sufficient professionalism and commitment to support the survival of democracy to allow political leaders learn and correct their mistakes. Blaming the military is off the option and table. Thus far, 13 years of democratic process provides a dependable time frame for stock taking on security sector governance and looking ahead for a better Nigerian society.

          From indications, Nigeria is still largely confronted by democratic and security challenges so much so that some foreigners and Nigerians predict and fear the integration of Nigeria by 2015. This makes the choice of the theme significant on “Making Sense out of Security Sector Governance”. True, before wishes become will, and prediction becomes “prophecy”. Nigeria needs to reconceptualise and confront the sources and manifestations of threats against security sector governance

Aim

          The primary aim of this presentation is to conceptualize and address the many sidednesses to security sector governance in the Nigerian democratic era from the grand strategy domain.

          The spirits of the objectives are reflected in the organisation of presentation.

Organisation of Presentation

a)     Conceptual clarifications of key technical words;

i)                   Democracy

ii)                 Security

iii)              Good Governance

iv)              Security Sector Governance (SSG)

b)    Security Sector Governance Determinism (SSGD);

c)     Assessment of How Nigeria has faired in Security Sector Governance; and

d)    Conclusion and Recommendations.

Democracy

          Democracy is often traced more significantly to the Greek City States. In Greek works, democracy means social contract between the people and government expressed as demo meaning people and kratia meaning rule or governance. Since then, democracy has been defined in several perspectives by scholars and statesmen. For Abraham Lincolm, democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people. There are many contending perspectives on democracy. The core fact remains that it is a social contract which involves popular participation in electing their leaders, who hold and exercise power in trust on behalf of the people. The operational elements of democracy include freedom of speech, freedom of association, including freedom to vote and be voted for, respect for rule of law, transparency, accountability and administration of social justice.

          Hence, democratic institutions are put in place for the development of political culture, including organisation of political parties, free and fair election. The legitimacy of elections are measured by transparency of the process, rather than the results. In effect, ballot boxers command the verdict, rather than court orders.

          Where transparency of elections takes place, losers concede defeat, while victors treat opponents with dignity as alternate leaders rather enemies who deserve the edge of the sword. Moreso, on national issues at executive and legislative domains, debates centre on ideas, values, politicise and programmes across party belongings. Critical views are upheld valid rather than seen as anti-ruling party, or personalities.

          Making sense of democracy includes having institutional values far stronger than strong personalities. True to the spirit of democratisation, the political space is open and broad to avoid over concentration of powers, functions and appointments at the centre. Where powers, positions and privileges are concentrated at the centre, the struggle for and control of power becomes war-like and highly commercialised. It also creates frictions and tensions on the levels of participation by tiers of government in resource exploration, exploitation, and administration of welfare and social justice. Invariably, democracy promotes security through security sector governance.

          In democracy, constitution is supreme, and spells out clearly inter-organ duties and relations. The more mutually reinforcing relations between the executive, legislature and judiciary become, the better for the promotion of purposeful governance, welfare and security that reflect and spread contentment or happiness to the people, without discrimination and marginalisation, because they are the root source of power(s).

Political Economy of Democracy

          Political economy of democracy means that it takes the unity of political and economic rights to make social contract between the people and those who have power in trust (Ake, C. 1981). Just as there is extensive campaign for the exercise of political rights through voting rights as a source of political power, the same should be true of grassroots campaigns for the broadest participation of individuals and groups in economic activities of job and wealth creation as well as enjoyment of social-welfare privileges. There should be no disconnect between political rights and socio-economic rights. Should there be any disconnect between these rights, it means people have abstract rights they cannot exercise, enjoy and defend (Karl Marx and F. Engels). However, where freedom in politics applies in socio-economic realm, people can use their voting rights to determine those worthy of holding power in trust, whether they are incumbents or not. Democracy is of the people and for the people rather than of the money bags (Akpuru-Aja 1997: 43-44).

          The foregoing analysis is very important to understand democracies in America and Western Europe. Political and socio-economic rights are fairly at work. Job and economy determine the choice of leadership power critically. Sarkozy of France in May 2012 election in France was the 11^th leader in Europe to lose power of incumbency based on job and economy. In November 2012, who occupies US presidency is likely to be determined by job and economy issues. This is what “making sense out of democracy” means and when upheld translates to making sense of security sector governance.

Security

          Security defines and connotes the assured safety to life, liberty and property (Buzan 1983: McNamara 1990: 142; 2-3; Imobighe 1979: 632-650). Without security, life loses its essence; community loses value and cohesion; government loses legitimacy. Without security there can be no liberty which is the freedom from threat or fear of losing life and property. It is the liberty of life that provides socio-economic and political rights of national security and development. This explains why the chief end of any responsible and responsive government is not only to promote welfare and security of the people, but to guarantee absence of internal and external threats and fears of losing lives, liberties, properties and cherished core values of the people in a sovereign entity.

          Understood generally, the popular conception is that security is about what military and para-military forces can do with guns, small arms and light weapons, including lethal tanks and bombers of sorts. Security means far more than what “gun” can do (McNamara 1990: 142; Imobighe 1998: 13-22; Akpuru-Aja 2012). It  includes what access to food can do (food security); what access to resources can do (economic security); what education employment or engagement of labour can do (job security); what education/welfare policy can do (social security); what order and stability in a system can do (political security); what clarity of constitutional provisions can do (constitutional security); what protection of the environment can do (environmental/health security).

          Together, and particularly in democratic context, non-military driven security variables are more germane and mainstreaming rather than ‘security’ through the barrel of guns, or armoured tank security.

Having established the commanding value of non-military-security variables, it is important not to lose sight of the utility of military force against external enemies and by extension, highly threatening enemies within. While the former is clear enough, the later needs qualification. In a case of lawlessness or anarchy in domestic polity, beyond the capacity building of Police Force, the armed personnel have a secondary constitutional duty to assist in restoring civil order and public security as soon as practicable, and then return to the barracks and avoid deprofessionalism. Where the duration of the military engagement in internal security management is not time bound, it is logical to argue that fragile peace and security still exists, which leaves much to be desired. Once people are disconnected or disengaged from liberty or freedom of thoughts, movements and enterprises, security loses its real value, and good governance becomes questionable. This explains the strong nexus between security and good governance and vice-versa.

          Ultimately, security is about individuals (human centred security), rather than leadership personalities; regime protection per se, or protection of the “state” (dominant ruling class) as preoccupation. Where the security of the State or regime is more dominant than security of the citizens, then the regime or state works at cross purposes with the contractual needs of the people.

Good Governance

          Let us start by stating that governance is an imperative of social contract between the people and government (Nnamani 2009: 29; Opadiran 2009: 7-11; Jega 2007). Logically, elements of social contract include the application of rule of law, transparency and accountability in job and wealth creation, the spread of contentment to all: including individuals, communities, component units and geo-political zones. Evidently, good governance is measured by the control and exercise of power on behalf of the people. It takes leadership in learning to learn character which is the foundation of good leadership (Chinese proverb). Hence, good governance demands knowledge base so as to be knowledge driven in the development of the people and resources. According to Nnamani (2009: 29) “good governance is a leadership approach to getting at democratic governance”. Of course, it means that continuous learning is vital to help the executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties and stakeholders to understand the true spirit of democracy. It helps in respecting and managing the structures and institutions to serve the people. In all, good leadership commands good followership.

Security Sector Governance

          True, security sector governance is not an entirely a new concept in grand strategy approach. However, as a concept, Clare Short, the British Secretary for International Development, highlighted it in 1998. Its greater emphasis dates back to the post-September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, New York - USA. (Aligwara 2010: 254-257). The USA saw the need review the perception and management of the post 9/11 security threats in military and non-military terms known as strategic and non-strategic approaches. It is a grand strategy approach that includes the development and synchronization of all components of national power for the promotion of welfare and security of the people, political order and stability.

          Security sector governance may mean different things to different states or people due to the perception of strategic environment. In the context of democracy particularly, security sector governance is a horizon or an expanse. It is not restricted to narrow and specialised institutional military and related sector. It covers detection, control and management of structural threats arising from all the sectoral dimensions in a society.

Every political system generates:

a)     Security values of liberty, happiness, order/stability, and

b)    Security fears and threats, which are legitimate.

The assumption is that any threat in any sector of a society is a threat to governance and national security. Understood this way, internal threats are beyond stresses and revolts by the military, to include lines of tensions, anxieties, fears and crises in economics, finance, politics, health, education, environment, public utilities, culture and constitutional provisions.

          According to Robert McNamara (1968: 142);

Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment has a false sense of security.

McNamara (149) continues, security is not military force though it may involve it; security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is development and without development there can be no security. Of course, what McNamara has done is to place security premium on the human dignity; the wellbeing of the individual rather than of any territorial defence, cult personality, protection regime, or class, or state defence.

          From the foregoing, security sector governance is about a wholistic framework of “security-watch” in all sectors of the political system against threats or dangers to life, liberty, property and cherished core values of people without discrimination as to gender, class, religion, ethnicity and mental health. Any security sector governance that disconnects from the people and their values, welfare and contentment is a false sense of security sector governance.

Security Sector Governance Determinism

          Security sector governance is no abstraction. It is a complex and business-like process of guaranteeing order and stability by the reproduction of rule of law, equity and social justice necessary to maintain level-headed national consciousness and sense of patriotism. The enabling factors, which may have objective and subjective dimensions include:

       i.            The Nature of Political economy;

     ii.            National Value System;

  iii.            Constitutional Provisions/Legislature;

  iv.            Organisation of Government – Pattern of Politics;

     v.            Security Communications and Management;

  vi.            Data Blank on Security Administration;

vii.            Character of Civil Society/Faith-passed Organisations;

viii.            Media Security Control; and

  ix.            External Variables.

Noteworthy is that the list is not exhaustive but the provided are quite informative and useful in an assessment of the Nigerian democratic context.

How Has Nigeria Faired in Security Sector Governance?

          An indisputable fact remains that security and good governance are mutually reinforcing and complimentary. None of them could be attained without necessary socio-economic and political conditions (Mbachu: 21). Let us attempt to present briefly the emerging security sector scenario in Nigeria since 1999 democratic process.

Political Economy of Nigeria

          Though Nigeria is potentially a rich land in all sectoral dimensions, lost opportunities are still witch hunting its democratic process. Since 1999, nothing has changed significantly. Nigeria has not seen diversity as a necessity for survival. The class structure of the state seems contented with a mono-cultural economy, which remains over dependent on exhaustible oil and gas sector to the neglect of the rich agricultural, solid mineral, maritime, manufacturing, culture, insurance and tourism, and telecommunication sectors. Even Nigeria’s population of about 160 million is an asset in work force, market creation and marketing. From one civilian transition to the other (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011), the ugly political economy reproduces threatening social contradictions (Akpuru-Aja 1998: 80-82). This is because knowledge of rich resource potentials is good, but unhelpful without value adding chains in determined diversification.

          How could Nigeria maintain security sector governance when about 70% of its population are in abject poverty, living on an average of US$1 daily? About 44% of its teeming youths are unemployed. Health and educational institutions suffer serious deficits. Human development index of 2011, placed Nigeria 153^rd out of 158 countries. Nigeria remains the 3^rd poorest country to India and China.

As logic expects, persistent mono-cultural economy and economic-financial contractions have reproduced and spread not only poverty and unemployment but inequity and social injustice. Plato holds that poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. 90% of national wealth is controlled by, perhaps, less than 10% of the population. There is no middle class but the upper class and down trodden. It creates divide and group hatred (Jega: 199). Reflecting on the Nigerian paradox of rich nation, poor people, Professor Sam Aluko once echoed that the rich cannot sleep because the poor is awake; and the poor is awake because of hunger. It is metaphorical and reflects how persistent crises of poverty and unemployment are sources of organised crimes, youth restiveness and military, and a new decade of terrorism.

          To make matters worse, unrepentant corruption in organisation of government, such as high cost of governance, pension scam, fuel subsidy scandal has reproduced a widening gulf between the rulers and the ruled. It makes for trust deficit, which limits patriotism. Even with many provocative rich Nigerians, capital flight is preferred to championing domestic investment and trade.

Decay in infrastructural development has been made worse by policy inconsistency, weak and corrupt institutional frameworks. Whatmore, Nigeria has been importing every sort of goods and services that it has the abundant capacity building to produce in surplus such as rice, tooth picks, cotton wools, clothings, hand bags and foot wears. Nigerian markets have become dumping grounds of foreign goods and services.

          Legislation to protect Nigerian trade and investment is too weak. Nigerian markets are dominated and flooded with foreign enterprises, goods and services. Driven by strategic-security trade policy, the US employs every weight of legislation and security to protect its trade and investment abroad. Recently, Argentina nationalised a Spanish coy and not only government of Spain but the European Union rose against the country. The E.U is lobbying the U.S to the effect. The question is how strong is Nigeria’s legislation and security to protect Nigerian based enterprises at home and, perhaps Dangote company enterprises abroad, if faced with nationalisation threat? It is food for thought.

          According to the Debt Management Office (DMO), Nigeria’s debt profile presently stands at $44 billion – the highest debt profile since 2007. In May 2011, it was 39 billion (Daily Sun Comment 2012, May 2: 18). Spiralling debt profile is a security anxiety, which is suggestive of the need for greater fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability.

Nature of National Ethos

          National ethos touches of national values indeed. Let us note that  Security sector governance is not wholly about politics, structures and institutional mechanisms. In the main, the human factor drives them all. Hence, attitude matters. Belief in oneness of people and mutual respect matter very much. Respect for rule of law, equity and social justice matters. Values of hardwork and honesty are important too. Sadly, Nigerians are yet to accept “Nigeria” as real and a common project with cherished rich values to preserve. Selfishness along individual, groups, ethnic, religious and political lines tends more to supercede national consciousness. It underscores the difficulty of nation building which is central for Nigerians to view and treat themselves as a corporate entity worthy to be cherished and defended. Societal values have broken down. No taboos any longer so to say. No sacredness even of life. Greed and selfishness has no limit. Differences are hardly open to dialogue as violence seems a mechanism of invitation to dialogue. No nation survives unethical attitudes and behavours.

Constitutional Provisions

          Constitutional provisions may make or mar security sector governance. Though there is no perfect constitution worldwide, tension packed constitutional provisions would heat up any political system, if unaddressed. In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution is generally a military craftsmanship with lines of ambiguities, omissions and inconsistencies open to undue exploitation by interest groups. Threats emanating from the 1999 Constitution provisions include;

a.     the over concentration of power at the centre;

b.     fiscal federalism which limits diversification of resource control by the federating tiers of government and stakeholders; (sections 44 (1) 46, and 56, 162 of the 1999 Constitution).

c.      the immunity clause, particularly on alleged criminal offences by governors and presidents; (section 308 of 1999 Constitution)

d.     lack of clear local government council autonomy; (section 7 of the 1999 Constitution)

e.      indigenship/citizenship; (section 147 of the 1999 Constitution) and

f.       National Assembly/State Assembly and oversight functions among others.

It is arguable that the overall security scenario in Nigeria, particularly on democratic process arises from perceived levels of paradox in the 1999 Constitution. Public expectations of Constitutional amendments since 1999 have no confidence posture yet. What makes it difficult is not in public interest, but self-serving interests. Getting the political economy, organisation of government and security sector governance aligned must necessarily challenge Constitutional provisions and convocation of national conference (as the case may be).

Organisation of Government – Pattern of Politics

          The organisation of government, or pattern of politics is key to security sector governance. Since 1999, arms of government, institutions and agencies in Nigeria are not synergised and synchronised towards a predictable policy direction. Part of the problem is that there are individuals stronger than institutions, who preside over the affairs of government and governance. It further explains political hiccups in civilian-to-civilian transition, leadership character at all levels, war-like and commercialised politics; elections which turn out to be selections and where defeats are not accepted; and where court orders rule more than ballot boxes. Evidently, there are a weak opposition. Invariable, there is hardly any tolerance of opposition, which is perceived and treated as enemity. Of course, no less should be expected when both the state and political parties lack clear ideological and theoretical clarity (Mbachu: 19).

          Justice system in Nigeria is yet to be very supportive. Justice is delayed. Justice appears for sale and politicised, which tends more to push the affected or victims to crime and unpatriotic attitudes for fear of justice never (Jega 2007).

          On high cost of governance, Professor Sylvester Monye, the Special Adviser to the President on Performance, monitoring and evaluation, noted that up to 11,800 Federal government projects alone are either abandoned or uncompleted nationwide. Why? Many past governments in Nigeria have routinely shunned projects and policies initiated by their predecessors. (Leadership Daily 2012, May 2:3). In addition, Federal Government maintains no less than 600 parastatals across the country. It is no plus for security sector governance. Noteworthy is the war-like politics where politicians arm the youths against parties and political opponents. In the post-election periods, demobilisation of the armed youths becomes difficult as technological they view arms under their control as means of livelihood. So, politicians should preserve the youths as precious and play politics of credentials.

Security Communications and Management

          In both military and non-military images, Nigeria is not in deficit of security bodies, and security institutions and agencies. For example, there are National Security Council (NDC), National Defence Council (NDC, State Security Council. Others include Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigerian Police force and several para-military agencies like Department of State Service, National Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Immigration Service, Prison Service, Customs and Excise Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).

          To facilitate coordination and operational effectiveness, there are also office of National Security Adviser (NSA), Special Service Office (for DIA. SSS, and NIA), Nigeria Police Council (NPC), Police Service Commission (PSC), Ministry of Police Affairs (NPA), and even Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

          At the apex is the office of the Presidency-Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces, and at the bottom include the Traditional Monarchs, faith-Based organisation and private sector security out-fits.

          The above notwithstanding, insecurity dimension in Nigeria is alarming. Terror breads fear, which is legitimate. Uncontrolled fear fuels violence and insecurity. Ethno-religious crisis, kidnapping and hostage taking, armed robbery, cultism, rape and a new decade of terrorism have become phenomenal. Talking more directly, security relations, coordination and management are ill-understood and defined. Security Communication is less than adequate and makes for undue rivalry between security and intelligence agencies that have exactly the same security responsibility.

          At times, there exists a gap between the intelligence community and the policy makers on one hand, and the intelligence community and the public on the other hand. Politicisation of intelligence fuels insecurity. As previously implied, the bottom-top approach to security is ignored. For example, community based organisations,  faith- based organisations, civil society and the public at large are not factored as security duty relevant. For sure, no security body or agency can make for security sector governance without acknowledging and synergizing with other stakeholders in security sector governance. Security process is about networking. It is wholly a collective knowledge and duty.

          The other security communications and management problems relate to orientation of security and intelligence operations in favour of military and related threats on one hand, and in the protection of the state and very important personalities on the other hand. It is an irony. It is a disconnect from other non-military related threats and the people proper. Rather than making sense of security sector governance, nonsense is made out of it. As previously noted, addressing the manifestations of poverty and rising unemployment rate is not by tanks versus anti-tanks, or training more army recruits of 500 experts for counter-terrorism. There must be determined efforts to address the non-military dimensions of security sector of governance through cutting down or controlling high cost of governance and corruption. The virtual takeover of the primary duty of the Nigeria Police Force by the armed forces needs to be managed better.

          Worse, lack of trust by the public for Police Force makes the containment of crime waves difficult. In contrast, low crime rate in United Kingdom and Norway could be attributed to increasing relations between the people and police. Trust is deficit dangerous for police managers and administrators and controlled against further degeneration to zero-level (Onwubuiko 2012:14). Change in police uniform may be good, but the more helpful in security sector governance is disciplined attitudinal change and public-support mode of operations.

          Responses or reactions to early warning system (EWS) is more reactive than pro-active, partly due to extreme politicisation of security issues and developments, and lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence by security agencies or bodies. The more disturbing is the allegations by some of intelligence operatives about policy failures to use timely and accurate intelligence against unnerving internal threats.

          Of equally threating are unconstitutional private security outfits such as Movement for Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Odua  Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Emancipation of  Niger Delta (MEND) fuelled by proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SMLWs). There is also the misperception that youth militancy and terrorism could be contained by gun fire rather than public driven intelligence and justice of terrorism.

          Where these dimensions of internal threats abound, the political economy is under threat; trade and investment is threatened; human security is endangered, and security sector governance is an illusion of reality.

Data Bank on Security Administration

          Data bank on security administration is very helpful in security sector governance. It is about data bank on individuals from birth-to-death on health records, age, sex, educational status, crime records, positions and privileges. It is constantly up dated, including deletion of the dead. It is very useful in population studies, determination of nationality and elections; recruitment policy in private – public sectors; development of social security policy to support the aged, widows, orphans, unemployed, physically and mentally challenged. Moreso, data base is wholly useful in tax regime: tax compliance and tax yield as a dependable source of internally generated revenue to help general security administration, and social security policy.

          The US, European countries and even South Africa are pacesetters in data bank on security administration, which makes planning effective. Without data, planning is ineffective, and determination of those with track records of criminality or excellence will be lost in security sector governance. Incidentally, for Nigeria, data on security administration in both military and non-military sectors is far-fetched. Nigeria’s air ports, sea ports, symbolic assets and locations are vulnerable and need more security consciousness and urgent attention. Borders are also too porous.

Civil Society and Faith – Based Organization

          Civil society, including faith-based organization, plays a very critical role in the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria. Civil society groups are independent of public authorities and private units of production such as firms and families. Though they are into policy advocacy in defence or promotion of their interests, including the constitution and rule of law, they do not seek to replace or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole (Jega 2007: 246-7). Hence, they enhance the integrity and efficacy of the democratic institutions and processes toward the consolidation of democratic political culture.

          However, for civil society groups to sustain democratization process in Nigeria, members must have to purge themselves of attitudes, behaviours and mind-sets of partisanship, religion, ethnicity, class and gender. This is central to promotion of civility in mobilizing popular participation through understanding of the electoral process; in partial monitoring and observation of the conduct of elections, and to document and disseminate observed lapses and irregularities. Moreso, Community and Faith-Based Organizations play peace-building roles in conflict or crisis situations by assisting victims with confidence building relief materials and business prospects (Gaya-Best and Katherine 2011: 121-186). Together, these are very useful roles in support of security sector governance, which should not be overlooked, but encouraged by governments, the private sector and the public.

Media Security

          Media can make or mar any security sector governance. In the Nigerian democratic processes and strategic environment, the media has played both positive, and negative (inflammatory) roles. Much of what citizens and political actors know and do are shaped by the media. Both print and electronic media promote mobilization and popular participation, transparency of electoral process and justice administration. They raise security alarms (whistle blows) in politics, finance, economics and even ethno-religious relations. They provide a broad spectrum for policy advocacy on democratization, national security and development.

          However, from their track records, unregulated media roles impact too negatively on democratization and national security. Extreme sensationalism on conflict and crisis situations across the country creates fears, which are legitimate, and unfortunately make reprisal violent tendencies inviting and worse. At times, publications based on sentiments rather than confirmed facts constitute insecurity. As a corollary, when media houses adopt “regional” or ‘partisan’ domain roles, security sector governance runs into trouble waters, especially in politics, and ethno-religious matters. This underscores the need to integrate the media into national security sector governance. It is not to cage them against objective – constructive reports but control security reports which tend more to make crisis situations and post – conflict transformation worse.

External Influences

          Invariably, when all stake holders in security sector governance play their objective and subjective roles within the bounds of rule of law and social justice, it becomes easy to contain the too many-sided external influences against democratization and national security in Nigeria. No external influences can breakdown any democratic process or system unaided by how the citizens and political actors play their roles in conceptualizing and addressing national issues.

Conclusion

          From the foregoing, making sense of security sector governance in Nigeria is very key to the sustainability of democratization processes and democratic political culture in Nigeria. It depends more on the collective mind to conceptualize and address national issues from its many-sidedness rather than military and related images. For Nigerian democracy to thrive; for national security to endure and for sustainable development, security sector governance must not be seen from the lens of what barrels of gun can do, but what good governance can do to create job, food, good health, good education, sustainable environment, free and fair elections and improved social harmony in the polity (and many more). This is the human security-centred domain of security sector governance. Stress levels arising from constitutional provisions, patterns of politics, leadership characters, media security and constitutional issue need no further trivialization. Rigid constitutional and more legislative technicalities would not much in heading of the rising anxieties. Political solution approach is all the more useful through attitudinal change by leaders and citizens to view Nigeria as a collective project in the 21^st Century.

          Doctrine of political necessity should include democratisation of concentrated powers, functions and appointments at the centre to allow complimentary roles by other tiers of security sector governance.

          There is every need to balance security and defence budget to strike a healthier balance between “gun” and “bread”. Extreme militarization of a democratic society remains a sign of insecurity against objective security sector governance. Once the human survival receives the highest premium in governance, security sector governance will be more self-regulating and allows the military and para-military bodies to play professional duties. Security imposed by militarization of society is insecurity and should be re-conceptualized and addressed, if democracy must thrive in Nigeria.

          Furthermore, there is an urgent need to develop a new national security policy framework to ensure that undue superiority-inferiority complex and rivalry between security-intelligences are controlled as they have need for greater collaboration, coordination and sharing of intelligence presently than ever. When security agencies that have common security duties work at cross purposes, they invariably constitute a threat to human and national security. High premium should be placed on human security over and above the territorial, regime, state and personality cult. Security community must work to win public confidence and operate better and safer through the people.

          The traditional monarchs and religious leaders, CBOs, FBOs and Civil Society should have more recognitions and respects as role players in security sector governance.

Finally, security sector governance is best projected, protected and preserved, if leadership and followership at levels nurse and cherish value respect for human dignity and wholesome fear of God. At 52, Nigerians should be preoccupied more with unity variables and possibility actions rather than divisive and disintegrative tendencies. The cause of Nigeria is not lost. With rich resource potentials as strengths and opportunities, Nigerians can overcome their weaknesses and threats, if they come together, think together and rise together towards a better society.

Thank you.

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