SECURITY
SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC ERA
By
Professor
Aja Akpuru-Aja
Introduction
May
29, 1999 was heralded by many Nigerians as the arrival of a renewed democratic
era, when the elected Obasanjo civilian administration was inaugurated to end
authoritarian regimes. Many perceived the return of democracy as the much
expected opportunity to correct some mistakes of the past and negative trends
in political economy and security sector governance. It was seen as an
opportunity to transform the country’s rich resource potentials into value
adding chains, which is an imperative to address internal threats associated
with poor conceptualization of security sector governance. Another level of
euphoria of expectation came from the assumption that civilian leaders are good
governors of the security sector than authoritarian regimes. This is not absolutely
true. Asian tigers’ experiences, like Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and
Indonesia which fluctuated between authoritarian and civilian regimes achieved
phenomenal economic growth and development. Indeed, civilian leaders are not
necessarily and automatically good governors (Jega: 171). The hallmark of good
security sector governance is driven by knowledge content, character and
passion for public spirited service.
Today,
May 29, 2012 marks 13 years of uninterrupted democratization process (1999,
2003, 2007 and 2011). Despite several lines of security challenges, the
military has demonstrated sufficient professionalism and commitment to support
the survival of democracy to allow political leaders learn and correct their
mistakes. Blaming the military is off the option and table. Thus far, 13 years
of democratic process provides a dependable time frame for stock taking on
security sector governance and looking ahead for a better Nigerian society.
From
indications, Nigeria is still largely confronted by democratic and security
challenges so much so that some foreigners and Nigerians predict and fear the integration
of Nigeria by 2015. This makes the choice of the theme significant on “Making
Sense out of Security Sector Governance”. True, before wishes become will, and
prediction becomes “prophecy”. Nigeria needs to reconceptualise and confront
the sources and manifestations of threats against security sector governance
Aim
The
primary aim of this presentation is to conceptualize and address the many sidednesses
to security sector governance in the Nigerian democratic era from the grand
strategy domain.
The
spirits of the objectives are reflected in the organisation of presentation.
Organisation
of Presentation
a)
Conceptual
clarifications of key technical words;
i)
Democracy
ii)
Security
iii)
Good
Governance
iv)
Security
Sector Governance (SSG)
b)
Security
Sector Governance Determinism (SSGD);
c)
Assessment
of How Nigeria has faired in Security Sector Governance; and
d)
Conclusion
and Recommendations.
Democracy
Democracy
is often traced more significantly to the Greek City States. In Greek works,
democracy means social contract
between the people and government expressed as demo meaning people and kratia meaning rule or governance.
Since then, democracy has been defined in several perspectives by scholars and
statesmen. For Abraham Lincolm, democracy is government of the people, by the
people and for the people. There are many contending perspectives on democracy.
The core fact remains that it is a social contract which involves popular
participation in electing their leaders, who hold and exercise power in trust
on behalf of the people. The operational elements of democracy include freedom
of speech, freedom of association, including freedom to vote and be voted for,
respect for rule of law, transparency, accountability and administration of
social justice.
Hence,
democratic institutions are put in place for the development of political
culture, including organisation of political parties, free and fair election. The
legitimacy of elections are measured by transparency
of the process, rather than the results. In effect, ballot boxers command the verdict, rather than court orders.
Where
transparency of elections takes place, losers concede defeat, while victors treat
opponents with dignity as alternate leaders rather enemies who deserve the edge
of the sword. Moreso, on national issues at executive and legislative domains,
debates centre on ideas, values, politicise and programmes across party
belongings. Critical views are upheld valid rather than seen as anti-ruling
party, or personalities.
Making
sense of democracy includes having institutional
values far stronger than strong personalities. True to the spirit of
democratisation, the political space is open
and broad to avoid over
concentration of powers, functions and appointments at the centre. Where
powers, positions and privileges are concentrated at the centre, the struggle
for and control of power becomes war-like
and highly commercialised. It also creates frictions and tensions on the levels
of participation by tiers of government in resource exploration, exploitation,
and administration of welfare and social justice. Invariably, democracy promotes security through
security sector governance.
In
democracy, constitution is supreme, and spells out clearly inter-organ duties
and relations. The more mutually reinforcing relations between the executive,
legislature and judiciary become, the better for the promotion of purposeful
governance, welfare and security that reflect and spread contentment or
happiness to the people, without discrimination and marginalisation, because
they are the root source of power(s).
Political
Economy of Democracy
Political
economy of democracy means that it takes the unity of political and economic
rights to make social contract between the people and those who have power in
trust (Ake, C. 1981). Just as there is extensive campaign for the exercise of
political rights through voting rights as a source of political power, the same
should be true of grassroots campaigns for the broadest participation of
individuals and groups in economic activities of job and wealth creation as
well as enjoyment of social-welfare privileges. There should be no disconnect between political rights and
socio-economic rights. Should there be any disconnect between these rights,
it means people have abstract rights they cannot exercise, enjoy and defend
(Karl Marx and F. Engels). However, where freedom in politics applies in
socio-economic realm, people can use their voting rights to determine those
worthy of holding power in trust, whether they are incumbents or not. Democracy
is of the people and for the people rather than of the money bags (Akpuru-Aja
1997: 43-44).
The
foregoing analysis is very important to understand democracies in America and
Western Europe. Political and socio-economic rights are fairly at work. Job and
economy determine the choice of leadership power critically. Sarkozy of France
in May 2012 election in France was the 11th leader in Europe to lose
power of incumbency based on job and economy. In November 2012, who occupies US
presidency is likely to be determined by job and economy issues. This is what “making
sense out of democracy” means and when upheld translates to making sense of
security sector governance.
Security
Security
defines and connotes the assured safety to life, liberty and property (Buzan
1983: McNamara 1990: 142; 2-3; Imobighe 1979: 632-650). Without security, life
loses its essence; community loses value and cohesion; government loses
legitimacy. Without security there can be no liberty which is the freedom from
threat or fear of losing life and property. It is the liberty of life that provides socio-economic and political rights
of national security and development. This explains why the chief end of
any responsible and responsive government is not only to promote welfare and
security of the people, but to guarantee absence of internal and external
threats and fears of losing lives, liberties, properties and cherished core
values of the people in a sovereign entity.
Understood
generally, the popular conception is that security is about what military and para-military forces can
do with guns, small arms and light weapons, including lethal tanks and
bombers of sorts. Security means far more than what “gun” can do (McNamara
1990: 142; Imobighe 1998: 13-22; Akpuru-Aja 2012). It includes what access to food can do (food
security); what access to resources can do (economic security); what education employment
or engagement of labour can do (job security); what education/welfare policy
can do (social security); what order and stability in a system can do
(political security); what clarity of constitutional provisions can do
(constitutional security); what protection of the environment can do
(environmental/health security).
Together,
and particularly in democratic context, non-military driven security variables are
more germane and mainstreaming rather than ‘security’ through
the barrel of guns, or armoured tank security.
Having established the commanding value
of non-military-security variables, it is important not to lose sight of the
utility of military force against external
enemies and by extension, highly threatening enemies within. While the former is clear enough, the later needs
qualification. In a case of lawlessness or anarchy in domestic polity, beyond
the capacity building of Police Force, the armed personnel have a secondary
constitutional duty to assist in restoring civil order and public security as
soon as practicable, and then return to the barracks and avoid
deprofessionalism. Where the duration of the military engagement in internal
security management is not time bound, it is logical to argue that fragile
peace and security still exists, which leaves much to be desired. Once people
are disconnected or disengaged from liberty or freedom of thoughts, movements
and enterprises, security loses its real value, and good governance becomes
questionable. This explains the strong nexus between security and good
governance and vice-versa.
Ultimately,
security is about individuals (human
centred security), rather than leadership personalities; regime protection per se,
or protection of the “state” (dominant ruling class) as preoccupation. Where
the security of the State or regime is more dominant than security of the
citizens, then the regime or state works at cross purposes with the contractual
needs of the people.
Good
Governance
Let
us start by stating that governance is an imperative of social contract between the people and government (Nnamani 2009:
29; Opadiran 2009: 7-11; Jega 2007). Logically, elements of social contract
include the application of rule of law, transparency and accountability in job
and wealth creation, the spread of contentment to all: including individuals,
communities, component units and geo-political zones. Evidently, good
governance is measured by the control
and exercise of power on behalf of
the people. It takes leadership in learning to learn character which is the foundation of good leadership (Chinese
proverb). Hence, good governance demands knowledge base so as to be knowledge
driven in the development of the people and resources. According to Nnamani
(2009: 29) “good governance is a leadership approach to getting at democratic
governance”. Of course, it means that
continuous learning is vital to help the executive, legislature, judiciary,
political parties and stakeholders to understand the true spirit of democracy.
It helps in respecting and managing the structures and institutions to serve
the people. In all, good leadership commands good followership.
Security
Sector Governance
True,
security sector governance is not an entirely a new concept in grand strategy
approach. However, as a concept, Clare Short, the British Secretary for
International Development, highlighted it in 1998. Its greater emphasis dates
back to the post-September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre,
New York - USA. (Aligwara 2010: 254-257). The USA saw the need review the
perception and management of the post 9/11 security threats in military and non-military terms known as strategic and non-strategic approaches.
It is a grand strategy approach that includes the development and synchronization
of all components of national power for the promotion of welfare and security
of the people, political order and stability.
Security
sector governance may mean different things to different states or people due
to the perception of strategic environment. In the context of democracy
particularly, security sector governance is a horizon or an expanse. It is not
restricted to narrow and specialised institutional military and related sector.
It covers detection, control and management of structural threats arising from
all the sectoral dimensions in a society.
Every political system generates:
a)
Security
values of liberty, happiness, order/stability, and
b)
Security
fears and threats, which are legitimate.
The assumption is that any threat in any
sector of a society is a threat to governance and national security. Understood
this way, internal threats are beyond stresses and revolts by the military, to include
lines of tensions, anxieties, fears and crises in economics, finance, politics,
health, education, environment, public utilities, culture and constitutional provisions.
According
to Robert McNamara (1968: 142);
Any
society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background
of acute food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and
per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient
public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment has a false sense of
security.
McNamara (149) continues, security is
not military force though it may involve it; security is not military hardware,
though it may include it. Security is development and without development there
can be no security. Of course, what McNamara has done is to place security
premium on the human dignity; the wellbeing of the individual rather than of
any territorial defence, cult personality, protection regime, or class, or
state defence.
From
the foregoing, security sector governance is about a wholistic framework of “security-watch”
in all sectors of the political
system against threats or dangers to life, liberty, property and cherished core
values of people without discrimination as to gender, class, religion,
ethnicity and mental health. Any security sector governance that disconnects
from the people and their values, welfare and contentment is a false sense of security sector governance.
Security
Sector Governance Determinism
Security
sector governance is no abstraction. It is a complex and business-like process
of guaranteeing order and stability by the reproduction of rule of law, equity
and social justice necessary to maintain level-headed national consciousness
and sense of patriotism. The enabling factors, which may have objective and
subjective dimensions include:
i.
The
Nature of Political economy;
ii.
National
Value System;
iii.
Constitutional
Provisions/Legislature;
iv.
Organisation
of Government – Pattern of Politics;
v.
Security
Communications and Management;
vi.
Data
Blank on Security Administration;
vii.
Character
of Civil Society/Faith-passed Organisations;
viii.
Media
Security Control; and
ix.
External
Variables.
Noteworthy is that the list is not
exhaustive but the provided are quite informative and useful in an assessment
of the Nigerian democratic context.
How
Has Nigeria Faired in Security Sector Governance?
An
indisputable fact remains that security and good governance are mutually
reinforcing and complimentary. None of them could be attained without necessary
socio-economic and political conditions (Mbachu: 21). Let us attempt to present
briefly the emerging security sector scenario in Nigeria since 1999 democratic
process.
Political
Economy of Nigeria
Though
Nigeria is potentially a rich land in all sectoral dimensions, lost
opportunities are still witch hunting its democratic process. Since 1999,
nothing has changed significantly. Nigeria has not seen diversity as a
necessity for survival. The class structure of the state seems contented with a
mono-cultural economy, which remains over dependent on exhaustible oil and gas
sector to the neglect of the rich agricultural, solid mineral, maritime,
manufacturing, culture, insurance and tourism, and telecommunication sectors.
Even Nigeria’s population of about 160 million is an asset in work force,
market creation and marketing. From one civilian transition to the other (1999,
2003, 2007 and 2011), the ugly political economy reproduces threatening social
contradictions (Akpuru-Aja 1998: 80-82). This is because knowledge of rich
resource potentials is good, but unhelpful without value adding chains in
determined diversification.
How
could Nigeria maintain security sector governance when about 70% of its
population are in abject poverty, living on an average of US$1 daily? About 44%
of its teeming youths are unemployed. Health and educational institutions
suffer serious deficits. Human development index of 2011, placed Nigeria 153rd
out of 158 countries. Nigeria remains the 3rd poorest country to
India and China.
As logic expects, persistent mono-cultural
economy and economic-financial contractions have reproduced and spread not only
poverty and unemployment but inequity and social injustice. Plato holds that
poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. 90% of national wealth is
controlled by, perhaps, less than 10% of the population. There is no middle
class but the upper class and down trodden. It creates divide and group hatred
(Jega: 199). Reflecting on the Nigerian paradox of rich nation, poor people, Professor
Sam Aluko once echoed that the rich cannot sleep because the poor is awake; and
the poor is awake because of hunger. It is metaphorical and reflects how
persistent crises of poverty and unemployment are sources of organised crimes,
youth restiveness and military, and a new decade of terrorism.
To
make matters worse, unrepentant
corruption in organisation of government, such as high cost of governance, pension
scam, fuel subsidy scandal has reproduced a widening gulf between the rulers
and the ruled. It makes for trust
deficit, which limits patriotism. Even with many provocative rich
Nigerians, capital flight is preferred to championing domestic investment and
trade.
Decay in infrastructural development has
been made worse by policy inconsistency, weak and corrupt institutional
frameworks. Whatmore, Nigeria has been importing every sort of goods and
services that it has the abundant capacity building to produce in surplus such
as rice, tooth picks, cotton wools, clothings, hand bags and foot wears.
Nigerian markets have become dumping grounds of foreign goods and services.
Legislation
to protect Nigerian trade and investment is too weak. Nigerian markets are
dominated and flooded with foreign enterprises, goods and services. Driven by
strategic-security trade policy, the US employs every weight of legislation and
security to protect its trade and investment abroad. Recently, Argentina
nationalised a Spanish coy and not only government of Spain but the European
Union rose against the country. The E.U is lobbying the U.S to the effect. The
question is how strong is Nigeria’s legislation and security to protect
Nigerian based enterprises at home and, perhaps Dangote company enterprises
abroad, if faced with nationalisation threat? It is food for thought.
According
to the Debt Management Office (DMO), Nigeria’s debt profile presently stands at
$44 billion – the highest debt profile since 2007. In May 2011, it was 39
billion (Daily Sun Comment 2012, May 2: 18). Spiralling debt profile is a security anxiety, which is suggestive
of the need for greater fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability.
Nature
of National Ethos
National
ethos touches of national values indeed. Let us note that Security sector governance is not wholly about
politics, structures and institutional mechanisms. In the main, the human factor drives them all. Hence,
attitude matters. Belief in oneness of people and mutual respect matter very
much. Respect for rule of law, equity and social justice matters. Values of
hardwork and honesty are important too. Sadly, Nigerians are yet to accept
“Nigeria” as real and a common project with cherished rich values to preserve.
Selfishness along individual, groups, ethnic, religious and political lines tends
more to supercede national consciousness. It underscores the difficulty of
nation building which is central for Nigerians to view and treat themselves as
a corporate entity worthy to be cherished and defended. Societal values have broken
down. No taboos any longer so to say. No sacredness even of life. Greed and
selfishness has no limit. Differences
are hardly open to dialogue as violence seems a mechanism of invitation to
dialogue. No nation survives unethical attitudes and behavours.
Constitutional
Provisions
Constitutional
provisions may make or mar security sector governance. Though there is no
perfect constitution worldwide, tension packed constitutional provisions would
heat up any political system, if unaddressed. In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution
is generally a military craftsmanship with lines of ambiguities, omissions and
inconsistencies open to undue exploitation by interest groups. Threats
emanating from the 1999 Constitution provisions include;
a.
the
over concentration of power at the centre;
b.
fiscal
federalism which limits diversification of resource control by the federating
tiers of government and stakeholders; (sections 44 (1) 46, and 56, 162 of the
1999 Constitution).
c.
the
immunity clause, particularly on alleged criminal offences by governors and
presidents; (section 308 of 1999 Constitution)
d.
lack
of clear local government council autonomy; (section 7 of the 1999
Constitution)
e.
indigenship/citizenship;
(section 147 of the 1999 Constitution) and
f.
National
Assembly/State Assembly and oversight functions among others.
It is arguable that the overall security
scenario in Nigeria, particularly on democratic process arises from perceived
levels of paradox in the 1999 Constitution. Public expectations of
Constitutional amendments since 1999 have no confidence posture yet. What makes
it difficult is not in public interest, but self-serving interests. Getting the
political economy, organisation of government and security sector governance
aligned must necessarily challenge Constitutional provisions and convocation of
national conference (as the case may be).
Organisation
of Government – Pattern of Politics
The
organisation of government, or pattern of politics is key to security sector
governance. Since 1999, arms of government, institutions and agencies in
Nigeria are not synergised and synchronised towards a predictable policy
direction. Part of the problem is that there are individuals stronger than
institutions, who preside over the affairs of government and governance. It
further explains political hiccups in civilian-to-civilian transition, leadership
character at all levels, war-like and commercialised politics; elections which
turn out to be selections and where defeats are not accepted; and where court orders rule more than ballot boxes. Evidently, there are a weak
opposition. Invariable, there is hardly any tolerance of opposition, which is
perceived and treated as enemity. Of course, no less should be expected when
both the state and political parties lack clear ideological and theoretical
clarity (Mbachu: 19).
Justice
system in Nigeria is yet to be very supportive. Justice is delayed. Justice
appears for sale and politicised, which tends more to push the affected or
victims to crime and unpatriotic attitudes for fear of justice never (Jega
2007).
On
high cost of governance, Professor Sylvester Monye, the Special Adviser to the
President on Performance, monitoring and evaluation, noted that up to 11,800
Federal government projects alone are either abandoned or uncompleted
nationwide. Why? Many past governments in Nigeria have routinely shunned
projects and policies initiated by their predecessors. (Leadership Daily 2012,
May 2:3). In addition, Federal Government maintains no less than 600
parastatals across the country. It is no plus for security sector governance.
Noteworthy is the war-like politics where politicians arm the youths against
parties and political opponents. In the
post-election periods, demobilisation of the armed youths becomes difficult as technological
they view arms under their control as means of livelihood. So, politicians
should preserve the youths as precious and play politics of credentials.
Security
Communications and Management
In
both military and non-military images, Nigeria is not in deficit of security
bodies, and security institutions and agencies. For example, there are National
Security Council (NDC), National Defence Council (NDC, State Security Council.
Others include Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigerian Police force and several
para-military agencies like Department of State Service, National Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Immigration Service, Prison
Service, Customs and Excise Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
(NSCDC).
To
facilitate coordination and operational effectiveness, there are also office of
National Security Adviser (NSA), Special Service Office (for DIA. SSS, and
NIA), Nigeria Police Council (NPC), Police Service Commission (PSC), Ministry
of Police Affairs (NPA), and even Ministry of Internal Affairs, National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).
At
the apex is the office of the Presidency-Commander-in Chief of the Armed
Forces, and at the bottom include the Traditional Monarchs, faith-Based
organisation and private sector security out-fits.
The
above notwithstanding, insecurity dimension in Nigeria is alarming. Terror
breads fear, which is legitimate. Uncontrolled fear fuels violence and
insecurity. Ethno-religious crisis, kidnapping and hostage taking, armed
robbery, cultism, rape and a new decade of terrorism have become phenomenal.
Talking more directly, security relations, coordination and management are
ill-understood and defined. Security Communication is less than adequate and
makes for undue rivalry between security and intelligence agencies that have
exactly the same security responsibility.
At
times, there exists a gap between the intelligence community and the policy
makers on one hand, and the intelligence community and the public on the other
hand. Politicisation of intelligence fuels insecurity. As previously implied,
the bottom-top approach to security is ignored. For example, community based
organisations, faith- based
organisations, civil society and the public at large are not factored as
security duty relevant. For sure, no
security body or agency can make for security sector governance without
acknowledging and synergizing with other stakeholders in security sector
governance. Security process is about networking. It is wholly a collective
knowledge and duty.
The
other security communications and management problems relate to orientation of
security and intelligence operations in favour of military and related threats on
one hand, and in the protection of the state and very important personalities
on the other hand. It is an irony. It is a disconnect from other non-military
related threats and the people proper. Rather than making sense of security
sector governance, nonsense is made out of it. As previously noted, addressing
the manifestations of poverty and rising unemployment rate is not by tanks
versus anti-tanks, or training more army recruits of 500 experts for
counter-terrorism. There must be determined efforts to address the non-military
dimensions of security sector of governance through cutting down or controlling
high cost of governance and corruption. The virtual takeover of the primary
duty of the Nigeria Police Force by the armed forces needs to be managed
better.
Worse,
lack of trust by the public for Police Force makes the containment of crime
waves difficult. In contrast, low crime rate in United Kingdom and Norway could
be attributed to increasing relations between the people and police. Trust is deficit
dangerous for police managers and administrators and controlled against further
degeneration to zero-level (Onwubuiko 2012:14). Change in police uniform may be
good, but the more helpful in security sector governance is disciplined attitudinal change and
public-support mode of operations.
Responses
or reactions to early warning system (EWS) is more reactive than pro-active,
partly due to extreme politicisation of security issues and developments, and
lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence by security agencies or
bodies. The more disturbing is the allegations by some of intelligence operatives
about policy failures to use timely and accurate intelligence against unnerving
internal threats.
Of
equally threating are unconstitutional private security outfits such as Movement
for Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Survival
of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Odua Peoples
Congress (OPC), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) fuelled by proliferation of
small arms and light weapons (SMLWs). There is also the misperception that
youth militancy and terrorism could be contained by gun fire rather than public
driven intelligence and justice of terrorism.
Where
these dimensions of internal threats abound, the political economy is under
threat; trade and investment is threatened; human security is endangered, and security
sector governance is an illusion of reality.
Data
Bank on Security Administration
Data
bank on security administration is very helpful in security sector governance.
It is about data bank on individuals from birth-to-death
on health records, age, sex, educational status, crime records, positions and
privileges. It is constantly up dated, including deletion of the dead. It is
very useful in population studies, determination of nationality and elections;
recruitment policy in private – public sectors; development of social security
policy to support the aged, widows, orphans, unemployed, physically and
mentally challenged. Moreso, data base is wholly useful in tax regime: tax
compliance and tax yield as a dependable source of internally generated revenue
to help general security administration, and social security policy.
The
US, European countries and even South Africa are pacesetters in data bank on
security administration, which makes planning effective. Without data, planning
is ineffective, and determination of those with track records of criminality or
excellence will be lost in security sector governance. Incidentally, for
Nigeria, data on security administration in both military and non-military
sectors is far-fetched. Nigeria’s air ports, sea ports, symbolic assets and
locations are vulnerable and need more security consciousness and urgent
attention. Borders are also too porous.
Civil
Society and Faith – Based Organization
Civil
society, including faith-based organization, plays a very critical role in the
sustainability of democracy in Nigeria. Civil society groups are independent of
public authorities and private units of production such as firms and families.
Though they are into policy advocacy in defence or promotion of their
interests, including the constitution and rule of law, they do not seek to replace or to accept responsibility for governing
the polity as a whole (Jega 2007: 246-7). Hence, they enhance the integrity
and efficacy of the democratic institutions and processes toward the
consolidation of democratic political culture.
However,
for civil society groups to sustain democratization process in Nigeria, members
must have to purge themselves of attitudes, behaviours and mind-sets of
partisanship, religion, ethnicity, class and gender. This is central to
promotion of civility in mobilizing popular participation through understanding
of the electoral process; in partial monitoring and observation of the conduct
of elections, and to document and disseminate observed lapses and
irregularities. Moreso, Community and Faith-Based Organizations play
peace-building roles in conflict or crisis situations by assisting victims with
confidence building relief materials and business prospects (Gaya-Best and
Katherine 2011: 121-186). Together, these are very useful roles in support of
security sector governance, which should not be overlooked, but encouraged by
governments, the private sector and the public.
Media
Security
Media
can make or mar any security sector governance. In the Nigerian democratic
processes and strategic environment, the media has played both positive, and
negative (inflammatory) roles. Much of what citizens and political actors know
and do are shaped by the media. Both print and electronic media promote
mobilization and popular participation, transparency of electoral process and
justice administration. They raise security alarms (whistle blows) in politics,
finance, economics and even ethno-religious relations. They provide a broad spectrum
for policy advocacy on democratization, national security and development.
However,
from their track records, unregulated media roles impact too negatively on
democratization and national security. Extreme sensationalism on conflict and
crisis situations across the country creates fears, which are legitimate, and
unfortunately make reprisal violent tendencies inviting and worse. At times,
publications based on sentiments rather than confirmed facts constitute
insecurity. As a corollary, when media houses adopt “regional” or ‘partisan’
domain roles, security sector governance runs into trouble waters, especially
in politics, and ethno-religious matters. This underscores the need to
integrate the media into national security sector governance. It is not to cage
them against objective – constructive reports but control security reports
which tend more to make crisis situations and post – conflict transformation
worse.
External
Influences
Invariably,
when all stake holders in security sector governance play their objective and
subjective roles within the bounds of rule of law and social justice, it
becomes easy to contain the too many-sided external influences against
democratization and national security in Nigeria. No external influences can
breakdown any democratic process or system unaided by how the citizens and
political actors play their roles in conceptualizing and addressing national
issues.
Conclusion
From
the foregoing, making sense of security sector governance in Nigeria is very
key to the sustainability of democratization processes and democratic political
culture in Nigeria. It depends more on the collective mind to conceptualize and
address national issues from its many-sidedness rather than military and
related images. For Nigerian democracy to thrive; for national security to
endure and for sustainable development, security sector governance must not be
seen from the lens of what barrels of gun can do, but what good governance can
do to create job, food, good health, good education, sustainable environment,
free and fair elections and improved social harmony in the polity (and many
more). This is the human security-centred domain of security sector governance.
Stress levels arising from constitutional provisions, patterns of politics, leadership
characters, media security and constitutional issue need no further
trivialization. Rigid constitutional and more legislative technicalities would
not much in heading of the rising anxieties. Political solution approach is all
the more useful through attitudinal change by leaders and citizens to view
Nigeria as a collective project in the 21st Century.
Doctrine
of political necessity should include democratisation of concentrated powers,
functions and appointments at the centre to allow complimentary roles by other
tiers of security sector governance.
There is every need to balance security and defence
budget to strike a healthier balance between “gun” and “bread”. Extreme
militarization of a democratic society remains a sign of insecurity against
objective security sector governance. Once the human survival receives the
highest premium in governance, security sector governance will be more
self-regulating and allows the military and para-military bodies to play
professional duties. Security imposed by
militarization of society is insecurity and should be re-conceptualized and
addressed, if democracy must thrive in Nigeria.
Furthermore,
there is an urgent need to develop a new national
security policy framework to ensure that undue superiority-inferiority
complex and rivalry between security-intelligences are controlled as they have
need for greater collaboration, coordination and sharing of intelligence
presently than ever. When security agencies that have common security duties
work at cross purposes, they invariably constitute a threat to human and
national security. High premium should
be placed on human security over and above the territorial, regime, state and
personality cult. Security community must work to win public confidence and
operate better and safer through the people.
The
traditional monarchs and religious leaders, CBOs, FBOs and Civil Society should
have more recognitions and respects as role players in security sector
governance.
Finally, security sector governance is
best projected, protected and preserved, if leadership and followership at
levels nurse and cherish value respect for human dignity and wholesome fear of
God. At 52, Nigerians should be preoccupied more with unity variables and
possibility actions rather than divisive and disintegrative tendencies. The
cause of Nigeria is not lost. With rich resource potentials as strengths and
opportunities, Nigerians can overcome their weaknesses and threats, if they
come together, think together and rise together towards a better society.
Thank you.
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